So how many people in South Los Angeles have a criminal history?

It's a simple question, but, as with many simple questions, there is no straight answer.

First, how do we define "South Los Angeles"?  Some social science researchers go with the boundary drawn by the LA County Department of Public Health for their service area, SPA-6.  But SPA-6 does not include Inglewood, which most would consider part of South LA.  By congressional district, District 35 includes Inglewood, Hawthorne, and surrounding areas, but it does not include the quintessential city, Compton, which is included in District 37, along with Long Beach.  On the Los Angeles County Board, Supervisor Ridley-Thomas represents District 2, which includes Copmton, Inglewood, and Lynwood (though excluding South Gate, Bell, and Vernon).  So that district looks like a good approximation, except it also includes Westwood, where my alma mater (UCLA) is located.  UCLA is a lot of things, but it ain't South LA.

Also, how do we define a person with a criminal history in South LA?  Do juvenile records count?  Arrest records?  And what about transient residents?  Answers to these questions actually don't matter much, for the simple reason that we lack official data on them.  And this brings me to a clearly unsatisfactory answer to the simple question posed in the title of this post: how many people in South Los Angeles have a criminal history?

As far as I know, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is the only government agency keeping track of data that can help us answer this question.  They divide up California into 4 regions for the purpose of keeping track of those released from state prisons on parole.  Los Angeles is its own region (Region 3), and there are several "parole units" in Region 3--though Long Beach (with a very sizable population of people released on parole) is part of Region 4.  Of the Region 3 Parole Units, Compton and Inglewood would account for many, though not all, people released on parole in South Los Angeles--again, excluding Long Beach.

According to their data covering the month of July 2011, a total of 21,937 people were released on parole in Region 3, excluding those on a non-revocable parole and those being deported by the immigration.  Of those, Compton received 1,307 and Inglewood received 3,120 for a total of 4,427.  So just between Compton and Inglewood, we can account for 1 in 5 people released into Region 3.  And that's 1 in 20 of people released on parole across the State of California (total: 87,125).

"Fine physical specimens"

Yesterday, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision upholding the lower court's order to reduce by 40,000 the population in California state prisons.  See Brown v. Plata, No. 09-1233.  There are 2 points I find worth making.

(1) This (another) 5-4 split is being defined by Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion as a fight about the scope of the power of the Judiciary.  Despite the explicitly-enabling statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Justice Scalia reminds the Court of the lack of expertise that the Court has to fashion policy changes and, on the basis of that institutional lack of expertise, questions the Court's rationale for the order to reduce the prison population.

Structural injunctions depart from that historical practice, turning judges into long-term administrators of complex social institutions such as schools, prisons, and police departments. Indeed, they require judges to play a role essentially indistinguishable from the role ordinarily played by executive officials.

True.  Structural injunctions of the type discussed in Brown v. Plata are to be avoided if possible.  However, this is hardly the first time that the judiciary got involved in structural reforms of "complex social institutions."  Of the categories Justice Scalia cites, one can easily think of specific examples.  For schools, Brown v. Board of Education II, along with a number of local consent decrees pursuant to the landmark cases, engaged in a structural reform of the magnitude over and beyond just the school setting.  It was about integrating segregated America, a highly ambitious project of Court-led structural reform.  For police departments, here locally, we have the example of the consent decree against the Los Angeles Police Department that is still in effect today.  I believe it reasonable to infer here that Justice Scalia disapproves of these "structural injunctions" as he refers to them.  I won't go into it too much here, but I am somewhat sympathetic to his position.  It's crazy to ask an inexperienced judge (or judges) to make complex policy decisions.  However, the reason that I ultimately disagree with him and find Plata, Brown v. Board of Education, and the consent decree against the LAPD all perfectly useful and integral part of our system of government, is that we have the Court get involved only when all else has failed.  The Court, to put it simply, is the only one that can check the executive and the legislative failure to govern.  When the majority fails to abide by the Constitution, then the Court's job is to protect the minority under the Constitution.  That is the role of the Court in our checks-and-balances system of representative democracy.  And that is the role of the Court that Justice Scalia feels uncomfortable filling.  I'm glad that the Court, despite his and other conservative justices' misgivings, stepped up.

(2) Maybe I shouldn't be by now, but I am somewhat surprised that Justice Scalia and Justice Alito appealed to the stereotype of "dangerous criminal" in making their arguments.  First, Justice Scalia writes, while describing who will be released under the Court's order:

Most of them will not be prisoners with medical conditions or severe mental illness; and many will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens who have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.

I have no doubt whatsoever that Justice Scalia, along with millions of others, sees no problem with this description of incarcerated people.  There is a strong sense of disrespect and disregard for the humanity of these individuals.  They are not even people.  They are "physical specimens," though "fine" ones at that.  Another key term here is that they are said to have "intimidating muscles."  Logically, there is no reason to include such a descriptor in this statement.  He could've simply said: Many will undoubtedly be healthy individuals with no medical or mental condition.  Nope.  Leave out any reference to "severe mental illness" when describing these "fine physical specimens" with "intimidating muscles."  But do mention the muscles that are intimidating...  to whom?  And why?  Because, rhetorically, this image of "fine physical specimens" with "intimidating muscles," coupled with "severe mental illness" of having an intractably criminal mind, screams "danger" to our primitive mind.  They will kill you, rape your wife, and eat your children--these fine physical specimens with intimidating muscles and severe mental illness.  They can, because they have the muscles.  They will, because they're crazy.  I won't go so far as to suggest that the image this description is intended to conjure up in the reader's mind is that of a black man.  I don't know Justice Scalia that well, and I won't make that accusation.  But I will say that, to Justice Scalia, these "fine physical specimens" do not belong to the same category of humanity as he does.

Justice Alito, likewise, takes a telling rhetorical twist, when he writes:

The three-judge court ordered the premature release of approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions.

Perhaps it's his military background in the army--and I hope it is--that suggested to him this particular device of comparing "criminals" to soldiers.  Even so, the message is clear: the Court is making a grave mistake in letting loose upon the populace three (3) Army divisions of criminals.  They will kill, pillage, and burn innocent civilians.  Don't forget I told you so.  It's the image of a war--where people that are in prison or "should be" in prison take one side, and the government form the other--that I find troubling.  Obviously, we're nowhere near discussing any "rehabilitative" services, if we view "them" as, well," them" and not part of "us."  To Justice Alito, as with Justice Scalia, these Army divisions of "46,000 criminals" are foreign, not of us.

In sum, if I may, I'm going to simply say: Justices Scalia and Alito perfectly demonstrate the mindset that show why the other branches of our government, ruled as they are by the majority rule, cannot effectively (and constitutionally, in this case) address this problem of segregating, alienating, dehumanizing, and repressing the population most severely impacted by mass incarceration.  Fear of the Other will almost always triumph over common sense.  In the short run, at least.  And it's the job of the Court, whether the Justices like it or not, to keep this fear from ruining us all.

In the interests of justice

Yesterday, I was in court for an expungement hearing for a client of mine, who sobered up and turned his life around in early 2010.  He's been able to find odd jobs here and there, but studies suggest that right now is a crucial period in his rehabilitation efforts.  See, e.g.,Tripodi, Kim & Bender, Relationship Between Employment and Crime Is Employment Associated With Reduced Recidivism?: The Complex Relationship Between Employment and Crime, 54 Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Crim. 706 (2010)

The study cited above makes an important (though somewhat common-sense) observation--namely, that obtaining employment within the first year after one's release from prison (1) increases his/her motivation to desist from crime and (2) leads to a change in behavior that marks an important milestone in the process of rehabilitation.

This is where the interest for "public safety" collides head-on with the interest for "reentry."  On one hand, the interest for public safety demands that we wait a long period of time before giving a person with a conviction history an equal employment opportunity.  Who knows when that person will re-offend?  A long passage of time without another contact with the criminal justice system is a common-sense (and well-researched) evidence to show that the person poses no additional risk to the safety of people and property.  On the other hand, the interest for reentry demands that we use employment as a means to motivate people with conviction history, especially in the first few months after their release, to help them commit to the long process of rehabilitation.

Where does "expungement" fall in the balance of these competing interests?  This isn't mere idle speculation.  Under California's "expungement" law, Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.4, a court, "in its discretion and the interests of justice," may grant a petition to expunge a conviction.  And "the interests of justice" analysis calls for precisely this balancing of competing interests.

If you were at yesterday's hearing for my client, you would've seen and heard these competing interests collide head-on.  I, of course, was emphasizing the interest of the State (and of my client) in rehabilitation.  The Court was very emphatic, however, about the fact that (1) my client suffered subsequent convictions and that (2) those convictions were very recent (in 1/2010).  In other words, too soon.  Not enough time has passed.  Come back later.  Public safety comes first.

I hope that my client's motivation for turning his life around perseveres through these difficult times.  Without stable employment, without people giving him a chance, without the forgiving acceptance from the society at large, he has his work cut out for him.  I wouldn't be surprised if he succeeds against all odds.  Then again, I wouldn't be surprised if he fails.  His life hangs on the balance, and it may fall either way.  It is clear, though, that our insistence on "public safety" tips it in one direction.  And that is just tragic.

A would-be politician with a conviction history

Thanks to Eliza from EBCLC for the pointer to this NYTimes story about a newly-elected mayor of a small town in Oklahoma, Mr. Christopher Linder, who, despite his electoral victory in that state, cannot take the office until his convictions are pardoned by the State of Arizona.  The Arizona Board of Executive Clemency decided not to recommend his pardon to Gov. Brewer.

But Mr. LaSota’s four colleagues voted no, dashing Mr. Linder’s hopes. They agreed with the chairman, Duane Belcher, who said Mr. Linder’s life of crime was not far enough in the past to merit a pardon.

Going to law school with a conviction

ABA Journal reported a few weeks ago that Mr. David Powers, one of the top students at St. John's University School of Law, was let go from the school, because his disclosure of an expunged 1999 conviction for drug possession did not include the original charge of sales.  How did the school find out?  When he asked them for a letter of support to pass the NY Bar's moral character examination.  According to a comment (#26) following the story, the school's application asks:

Have you ever, either as an adult or juvenile, been cited, arrested, taken into custody, charged with, indicted, convicted or tried for, or pleaded guilty to the commission of any felony or misdemeanor, or the violation of any law, except minor parking violations, or been the subject of any juvenile delinquency or youthful offender proceeding?  If yes, please explain.  Please note: although a conviction may have been expunged or sealed by an order of a court, it nevertheless should be disclosed.

It starts out as a yes/no question.  Presumably, Mr. Powers answered it in the affirmative.  Presumably, he then indicated that he had an expunged drug possession conviction from 1999, as a way of explaining.  Mr. Powers, I'm sure, thought that this was sufficient to satisfy the call of the question.  The school, on the other hand, did not.

The traditional narrative about "a reformed criminal" says that, once a person truly reforms, s/he will freely and fully own up to his/her past mistake and be completely open about it with others.  The reality is less straightforward than that.  Sure, some will be completely open with others.  But, almost to the last one, they do so because they have since integrated their criminal past into their identity: "I am a reformed ex-felon."  They wear the stigma of a criminal conviction as a badge of experience and wisdom--and a sign of hope--as I do my identity as a former drug addict.  I hit the rock bottom, fell right through it, and then somehow, by the grace of God, made it out alive.  And, invariably, when we're sharing our stories, our audience is those that are fast approaching the bottom themselves.  And, invariably, the message is the same: Brother/sister, I hope you too make it out alive as I have.

But we don't always own up to our past mistakes.  Complete and utter transparency, i.e. surrender of privacy regarding one's past mistake, isn't a prerequisite to true rehabilitation.  Time and time again, in this line of work, I meet people who keep their darkest secrets even from their family and closest friends.  One of my first clients, when we first met, had a 40-year old murder conviction that even his wife did not know about.  Yet, ever since his release from prison, he led an exemplary life, serving others and providing for his family.  He was only the first.  Most of my clients hide their past convictions from just about everyone.  For Pete's sake, haven't we all watched Les Miserables and know the story of Jean Valjean?

Speaking of politicians with a conviction history...

I know nothing about Jackson City, Tennessee or the laws of that state regarding political rights of people with conviction history.  According to an article in The Jackson Sun, however, "a state law [requires] felons to petition a circuit court for their citizenship rights to be restored before they can hold elected office."  A former Jackson City Councilman Johnny Dodd, who also worked as a substitute teacher with the Jackson-Madison County school system until very recently, is in trouble for giving what seems to be a false answer on his applications for the substitute teacher job, as well as for not having his citizenship rights restored before running for his City Councilman position.

In response to these revelations, the school district terminated Mr. Dodd's employment and changed their policy to "prohibit[] people with felony records from working in the district."

There are 2 separate issues here.  One is that of his "dishonest" answer.  Again, I know nothing about Tennessee laws, but I note that, if it were in California, Mr. Dodd would've been entitled to answer "no" to those questions regarding his convictions if he had set aside and dismissed under Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.4 or 1203.4a.  The other is the matter of his convictions themselves.  The articles linked to above refer to a 1987 felony conviction for grand larceny and a 1999 misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct.

The 1987 grand larceny conviction, according to one of the articles, stems from an accusation that he stole various items from the store he was working at, including "a basketball goal, a television, a VCR, and two radar detectors."  The 1999 disorderly conduct conviction involves an incident where he "told a crowd of 100 to 150 people to ignore police orders to disperse" at a night club where he was the disc jockey.

After this lengthy description of the facts as reported in the articles, I have a couple of thought.  The first is that the school district's policy change likely runs afoul of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, according to EEOC, makes "an absolute bar to employment based on the mere fact that an individual has a conviction record... unlawful."  This particular jurisprudence on Title VII disparate impact theory mandates that an employer show "business necessity" for using a conviction record before making an adverse employment decision based on it.

The second point is more of a general observation--something I've noted before but bears repeating here--that a long history of rehabilitation seems to count for naught.  Granted, we have what appears to be an act of dishonesty on Mr. Dodd's part, if in fact it turns out that he really lied on his applications.  Even so, it is understandable why he would feel it necessary to deny his past convictions.  As Mr. Dodd himself put, "What do I have to do to put this behind me?"  The answer that the Jackson-Madison School District gave him is: there's nothing you can do.

I'll end this post with a statement from a former superintendent of the school district, Roy Weaver: "Weaver said Dodd's community activism, his work with the Boys and Girls Club, serving as a city councilman and his support of education made him a good role model for students. Dodd had served on the council since 1999."

Politicians with a conviction history?

According to Wikipedia, the town of Rehoboth in the State of Massachusetts has an open town meeting run by a board of selectmen.  This Monday night, 384 of its 10,172 residents attended and voted down a petition proposed by the board to do a criminal background check on candidates running for a local office.  And I am pleasantly surprised (though "surprised" may be too mild a term here) to read that:

[A selectman arguing for doing a criminal background check on political candidates] was booed for his statement while several residents and other town officials who spoke against the article received hoots and hollers of approval.

Seriously, what is going on here?  I suspect some unusual local politics going on here, not reported in the news article above.  Why did the board of selectmen propose the article?  Was there someone running for office in the recent election that they didn't like and had a criminal record?  Was this person well-liked by the citizens of Rehoboth?  What's going on here?  It's not every day that we see "booing" for those tough background-check-everybody-and-their-cousin folks.  And it's certainly unheard of that we see those working to limit background checks receive "hoots and hollers of approval."

But this episode dovetails well with what a "guest" at the All of Us or None meeting last night mentioned, i.e. that we need a champion for our cause.  We need to work to elect into a political position an individual(s) with personal experiences of facing barriers due to his/her conviction history.  It's an obvious point.  And it should be done.  When I heard it, however, I thought it unlikely that it'll happen in my lifetime.  Well, then again, something like this thing at Rehoboth comes around to make me think.... Maybe it will.

IHSS, Round 2

Governor Schwarzenegger tried to keep people with conviction history out of the care provider industry before, but he was blocked by the courts.  So he's going after it again--this time, in partnership with the LA Times.  A fitting partnership, I must say, given the paper's track record in fear-mongering against people with conviction history.

The current law already prohibits an IHSS recipient from employing her family member through the program if the family member has been convicted of child abuse, elder abuse, or Medicare fraud in the past 10 years.  The law does not care if the family member completely turned his life around, or if he may be the best caregiver for the IHSS recipient.  The 10-year ban is absolute.  Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code section 12305.81.

And the IHSS program is already set up to give the recipients the freedom and duty to screen whom they choose to care for them.  The existing law exempts IHSS agencies from liabilities arising out of the conduct of caregivers they refer to recipients.  Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code section 12301.6(f).

With this setup, individual recipients must follow existing laws on hiring people with conviction history.  For example, under California's Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA), background check companies cannot report convictions older than 7 years.

If the laws change (as proposed by Governor Schwarzenegger) then the Department of Social Services would be exempt from the ICRAA provisions and will consider old convictions too, substituting its judgment for the judgment of recipients as to who is best qualified to provide care for them.

Needless to say, advocates are already working hard to make sure that rational deliberation wins over irrational fear-mongering.  (Thank you, Jessie!)  Here's hoping and praying that California legislators are more level-headed than LA Times reporters.

Kevin Pimentel

I first met Kevin when my law school friends and I started a small free legal clinic in O.C.  He brought with him not only his expertise in family law, immigration, and estate planning but also his invaluable and inspirational approach to serving those in need.  He treated our clients with respect and honesty.  He was never afraid or ashamed to say he didn't know an answer to a question, though his years of experience also gave him the confidence that inspired trust.

I heard this morning that he had passed away last Friday.  It hasn't been that long--not more than 2 weeks--since we last spoke.  It was just one of those phone calls we routinely had--me calling him to ask for help.  I gave him a call to see if he's interested in helping out a now-indigent senior recover some of the money her relatives defrauded out of her through a divorce proceeding.  He did a quick research while we were on the phone and determined that there's a fighting chance for her.  We promised to connect after I discover additional facts.  As I proudly shared with my wife that evening, his calm yet firm response to my request was: "That's not right.  Let's see what we can do to fix that."  The man was moved by a sense of justice and fairness.  I was, and am, proud to call him a friend.

UPDATE:  I went to a public viewing following his funeral service last week, and quite a few APABA members came to show their respect.  And APABA posted an obit for Kevin on their website.  To quote, "Kevin’s death is a tremendous loss for our communities and for APABA.  We will miss him dearly."

"First, they came for sex offenders"

An article by David Rittgers from the Cato Institute, discussing potential implications of the recent Comstock decision by SCOTUS.  I don't agree with them often, but here I do--at least with its concern.  Especially of note:

I responded forcefully that such a system is antithetical to American traditions of due process. Battlefield detention is necessary to incapacitate insurgents and terrorists overseas, and is often employed in lieu of killing them. Broad powers of detention without trial in the criminal context do not make Guantanamo less controversial; they bring it on to our shores and in to our courtrooms. If we have enough information to show that someone is a threat by a preponderance of the evidence in order to detain them, we probably have enough to indict them for conspiracy. One of the reasons that few people turn to political violence in the United States is that the Bill of Rights bars the government from telling the citizenry how to worship, what to think, and what they can say. Generally speaking, you have to actually be a criminal to get charged as one.

SHRM survey & presentation on "Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks"

I was alerted by a listserv email to a recent study of background check practices among employers, conducted by Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM).  An informative read.  This being a self-reported survey, I'm skeptical how accurately it reflects the reality of employer policy vis-a-vis criminal background check; however, this is the first time I've ever seen any survey of this type, so I'm very much interested in its findings.  Among them are:

1. 73% of all responding ERs conduct background check for everyone, while only 19% do so for selected job candidates;
2. The perceived severity of a crime is highly relevant to whether it will materially impact an applicant's employment prospect (81% finding that it's "very influential" in their decision NOT to extend a job offer);
3. Employee safety (61%) and concern for negligent hiring (55%) are the 2 most important reasons for conducting a background check; and
4. The vast majority of ERs (63%) claim to allow job candidates to explain the results of criminal background check prior to making an adverse decision.

Right away, I notice that, perhaps because of the framing of the survey question, ERs consider the severity of the crime more relevant (81%) than the crime's relevance to the position applied for (73%).  Well, a simple narcotics possession under California Health & Safety § 11360 is a non-reducible straight felony, whereas battery under California Penal Code § 242-243 is most often a misdemeanor.  Well, you tell me who's less likely to be violent just based on the type and "severity" of crime.  To be fair, the existing EEOC guideline on Title VII does mention both the nature and gravity of an offense as a factor to consider.  Still, there's no reason why the increasingly arbitrary felony/misdemeanor distinction in criminal law should dictate employment policies of a private organization.

UPDATE: The right to vote while in prison, Farrakhan v. Gregoire

The 9th Circuit decision overturning Washington State's felon disenfranchisement law based on its disparate impact on people of color, has been ordered for an en banc review, according to Sentencing Law and Policy blog. As previously discussed, the decision is not likely to survive this or the next appellate review by the U.S. Supreme Court. But who knows? I'll be certainly glad to be proven wrong in my prediction.

U.S. Census

Over the last year or so, I've been seeing a steady flow of clients who are denied employment from the U.S. Census Bureau due to their criminal record. There's precious little I can help them with. (Judging by the widespread complaint among attorneys on various reentry listservs, I'm not alone in feeling frustrated by the Bureau's wall of silence.) Nowhere in their communication to the applicants does it show what criteria they're using to disqualify people, whether there's an appeal process to show rehabilitation or lack of nexus between the job and the conviction, or even what the disqualifying offense/arrest is! And all of this, based solely on the FBI background check, known to have over 50% error rate (e.g. mismatched names, records with no disposition, etc.)

Today's NY Times ran an editorial about this very issue (aptly-titled "We can't tell you why") reporting on a class action filed against the Bureau by the lead counsel, Outten & Golden, along with a group of community orgs, which alleges that the Bureau's actions violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The NY Times editorial explains the concept of Title VII well enough.

The class action complaint alleges that, according to the Bureau's director, Robert Groves, its "concealed policy" is in fact to disqualify people with a prior conviction or pending charge for:

(1) Certain categories of crime, such as murder, sex offenses, robbery, voter fraud, or other crimes that suggest a threat to safety or the integrity of census data, or

(2) Crimes of dishonesty, burglary, theft, or vandalism

Except when the person conclusively demonstrates that he or she does not present a current threat.

Now, I first learned about this "policy" about a month ago from a listserv posting of an attorney who had corresponded successfully (unlike me and many other attorneys who ran into a bureaucratic goose-chase and gave up) with the Bureau. And I just laughed with disbelief. Like I said before, the Bureau does not make this information available to anyone or even hints at its existence in the dismissive termination letters sent to affected applicants. I have a lot of problem with this so-called "policy" itself, but actually following it would be an huge improvement over the present situation.

Anyway, upon learning of this "hidden" policy, I've been advising my clients to act as if it is in fact followed. I'm arguing nexus and negation in all my letters to the Bureau on behalf of my clients. And I'm asking for a hearing or some way to make the case that my clients do not pose any threat to "safety or the integrity of census data." So far, no luck. This is tilling at the windmills par excellence. FYI, this is what President Obama said about reentry and employment while campaigning for presidency.

America is facing an incarceration and post-incarceration crisis in urban communities. Today, nearly 2 million children have a parent in a correctional facility. In the U.S. Senate, Obama has worked to provide job training, substance abuse and mental health counseling, and employment opportunities to ex-offenders. In addition to signing these important programs into law, Barack Obama and Joe Biden will create a prison-to-work incentive program, modeled on the successful Welfare-to-Work Partnership to create ties with employers and third-party agencies that provide training and support services to ex-offenders, and to improve ex-offender employment and job retention rates. Obama and Biden will also work to reform correctional systems to break down barriers for ex-offenders to find employment.

I don't know how he's gonna do all that, if his administration denies even temporary employment to people with decades-old arrests.

Section 8 and crime

I have to leave work in 5 min., so this post will be short.

While doing research into a local housing authority's discretion to grant an exemption to Section 8 applicants with disqualifying criminal records, I came across an article in the Telegraph Herald, entitled Study: Section 8, crime linked, published on 12/6/2009.

The article discussed the result of a study by Alta Vista Research, which found that "Section 8 tenants, compared to other residents, are arrested far more often."

This can be evidence that links poverty and crime, as the article makes the case. Or it can be a reason to question the policing practice at Dubuque, IA. There are multiple ways to interpret this evidence. But how does this piece of evidence, if true, lead to the conclusion that we need to exclude "criminal elements" from Section 8?

By assuming that too many "criminal elements" are receiving Section 8 and that we can separate "criminal elements" from more "deserving" applicants for the benefit somehow--usually through a background check. But this is a flawed assumption. People are not neatly categorizable between the good and the bad. We're mostly just ugly. And no amount of background check can help us separate the three.

Angela Davis & Michelle Alexander fundraisers for A New Way of Life Reentry Project

My employer, A New Way of Life Reentry Project, is doing a couple of fundraiser in February.

Both events are actually free, but we ask that you donate $50/$10, respectively, for VIP Reception with Angela Davis and/or Presentation & Discussion with her following. And part (about 1/3) of the proceeds from the sale of The New Jim Crow will go to A New Way of Life Reentry Project.

A New of Life Reentry Project's executive director had talked with Angela Davis during her visit to Orange County for 2009 presidential fundraising about the possibility of the former black panther's fundraising for A New Way of Life Reentry Project, and she agreed. So here it is.

As for Michelle Alexander, my executive director (and the executive director of WLCAC) liked her book so much that they invited her to come out to do a book signing event.

(1) Angela Davis

Sunday, February 21, 2010

WLCAC, Phoenix Hall

10950 South Central Ave.

Los Angeles, CA 90059

2-3pm : VIP Reception with Angela $50

3-5pm : Presentation & Discussion $10

(2) Michelle Alexander (author of The New Jim Crow, previously discussed here)

Thursday, February 25, 2010

WLCAC, Freedom Hall

10950 South Central Ave.

Los Angeles, CA 90059

I hope to see you there.

The right to vote while in prison, Farrakhan v. Gregoire

In Farrakhan v. Gregoire, decided on January 5th, 2010 by a 3-judge panel in the 9th Circuit, the Court strikes down the Washington state's disenfranchisement of people currently incarcerated in state prisons as violating § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 under its "totality of circumstances" test, due to the large racial disparity in incarceration rates.

I doubt that the Supreme Court will uphold this decision, even if the 9th Circuit sitting en banc may, because the Court's rationale depends on the type of racially disparate impact analysis so disfavored by the highest court. Still, the decision is a breath of fresh air in the bleak "post-racial" and "color-blind" world we live in.

Alex Sanchez to be freed on bail

At today's bail hearing (ordered by the 9th Circuit), Judge Real reversed his earlier ruling of no bail and set $2 million bail for Alex Sanchez. WitnessLA.com has the best details regarding the bail hearing. This made my day.

UPDATE: Tom Diaz has been on the fence about this case from Day 1 and points out an interesting lack of coverage from the media about the case. To quote him, " if Sanchez is truly innocent, he has been the victim of terrible mistreatment. If he is guilty, he pulled off a scam that makes Ponzi scheme artist Bernie Madoff look like an amateur." Indeed.

The more I think about this, the more curious I become why Alex's attorney can't comment on the bail hearing. Was there a gag order? If so, why? Has there been some unusual bail conditions imposed on the defendant by Judge Real? What's going on?

Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (2010)

After a long break from work, I returned to work to find a bit of turmoil caused by a co-worker's sudden departure. I cannot go into details here for various reasons, but I am saddened by how bitter and hostile the whole episode has made everyone in my organization.

We are ostensibly advocating for a different kind of society, one with more fairness, mercy, and hope than the one we currently live in. However, the way this episode played out betrays how deeply mired in our current world-view we all are. Despite our ideals, we again sought self-interest and assumed the worst in those that acted against us.

Against this backdrop, my executive director handed me an advance copy of The New Jim Crow by Michelle Alexander, which went on sale today. Among those working in the reentry field, the author's central argument is nothing new—that the current regime of mass incarceration is functionally equivalent to slavery and Jim Crow. And it describes the familiar feeling of inevitability and hopelessness that such an insight invariably causes in those sensitive to the cause: "If racial inequality and oppression perseveres through transformation, what good is it to fight against it?"

If the movement that emerges to challenge mass incarceration fails to confront squarely the critical role of race in the basic structure of our society, and if it fails to cultivate an ethic of genuine care, compassion, and concern for every human being—of every class, race, and nationality—within our nation's borders (including poor whites, who are often pitted against poor people of color), the collapse of mass incarceration will not mean the death of racial caste in American. Inevitably, a new system of racialized social control will emerge—one that we cannot foresee, just as the current system of mass incarceration was not predicted by anyone thirty years ago. No task is more urgent for racial justice advocates today than ensuring that America's current racial caste system is its last.

Indeed. I agree wholeheartedly with her assessment of what it takes to dismantle the new Jim Crow—nothing short of a fundamental change in our culture, i.e. cultivation of "an ethic of genuine care, compassion, and concern for every human being." And such a change is not won in courts or through law. It is won person by person, by each of us living that life of "genuine care, compassion, and concern for every human being" at every moment of our lives, with every person we meet. And so I am saddened that my organization failed to live up to that new ethic this time.

UPDATE: IHSS background check

Peter Sheehan of Oakland-based Social Justice has been working in the field of background check laws for over 3 decades. And he has done some amazing work. Earlier this year, he helped me with removing a sex offender registration requirement for a client of mine, who had been adjudicated in a juvenile court of sexual penetration with a minor (while he himself was a minor, sheesh). Now, Peter has come through in a big way for so many people of low income that depend on IHSS payments. Below is an excerpt from his email to me this morning.

[W]e have a preliminary in IHSS litigation (Ellis v. Wagner) enjoining DSS from continuing to carry out its policy of asking for or disqualifying IHSS providers or potential providers due to felony or serious misdemeanor until a final hearing on the merits in late January. From the brief argument I think the high probability of success swung the court on the preliminary so that is a good sign for January.

Way to go, Peter!

UPDATE: The San Francisco Chronicle published an article about the case.

Employer-driven initiative

Last Friday, NPR Morning Edition reported a story about a couple of companies in the Bay area that make it a point to hire people with criminal records. Down here in Southern California, not many companies are friendly to people with criminal records. Over the years, I've made connection with a number of individuals but only one "company" that actively consider hiring people with records.